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Abstract: The present research aims to identify the main peculiar economics of professional team 
sports, reflect on whether they apply to esports, and derive some implications. To achieve this aim, 
two sequential snowballing literature reviews were conducted. First, the literature on the peculiar 
economics of professional team sports was reviewed and assessed by the authors, based on their 
degree of distinctiveness and how core they are for the sector. Second, based on the main peculiar 
economics identified, a similar process considering economic aspects in the esports literature was 
conducted. The first review enabled the identification of 50 peculiar economics of professional team 
sports, of which 12 were assessed as the most distinctive and core to the sector. These 12 main pe-
culiar economics were then considered in relation to the esports literature. This second review ena-
bled the identification of some economic similarities and differences between sports and esports, 
before deriving some implications. 




Esports refers to competitive video gaming, often in the form of professional events 
(league competitions, tournaments, championships or battles/matches) and typically be-
tween sponsored gamers or teams (University of Melbourne 2020). It is a growing phe-
nomenon, enjoying a rapid economic development worldwide, with revenue moving 
from USD 130m in 2012 to USD 1.6b forecasted in 2023 (Gough 2019, 2020). Esports has 
attracted attention inside and outside academia, opening debates on its definition and on 
whether it should be considered as a sport (see e.g., Cunningham et al. 2018; Jalonen 2019; 
Summerley 2020), as well as its future evolution (Kim et al. 2020; Peng et al. 2020; Scholz 
2019). Additionally, with the increasing number of well-established professional sports 
(e.g., football) clubs sponsoring esports (Bertschy et al. 2020), actual links between sports 
and esports have started to emerge. Consistent with the idea that new technologies trans-
form some peculiar economics of professional sports (Feuillet 2019), it is therefore argua-
ble that links between sports and esports can contribute to form a new economic peculi-
arity of professional sports. Reciprocally, an attempt to apply the peculiar economics of 
professional team sports (see e.g., Neale 1964) to esports contributes to a better under-
standing of the similarities and differences between sports and esports, thus expanding 
the debate about whether esports should be considered as a sport. This is in line with 
recent research attempting to conceptualise esports based on a sport-like model (see e.g., 
Qian et al. 2020). Such attempts may help scholars improve their understanding of the 
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theoretical economic propositions at the foundation of esports as a business, and practi-
tioners in both sport and esports fields (e.g., managers and league organisers) better in-
form their strategies. 
The present research aims to identify the main peculiar economics of professional 
team sports, reflect on whether they apply to esports, and derive some implications. To 
achieve this, the three authors conducted two sequential literature reviews. First, the lit-
erature on the peculiar economics of professional team sports was reviewed and assessed. 
Second, on the basis of this, a similar process considering economic aspects in the esports 
literature was conducted. 
The article is structured as follows. The second section reviews the literature on the 
peculiar economics of professional team sports. It explains the process applied, provides 
the peculiar economics derived from the review and identifies the ones selected as the 
most distinctive and core to the way the industry operates. The third section reviews the 
literature relevant to the economics of esports, with a focus on whether the main peculiar 
economics of professional team sports apply to esports. The fourth and last section dis-
cusses the results, provides some implications, acknowledges limitations and concludes, 
highlighting the contribution of the article to the debate about esports as a sport or not. 
2. Materials and Methods: Review and Assessment of the Peculiar Economics of Pro-
fessional Team Sports 
2.1. Review Process and 50 Peculiar Economics Identified 
The first step of the process consisted of an extensive literature review to draw a 
comprehensive list of the peculiar economics of professional team sports. A snowballing 
approach was applied to identify such peculiar economics. In line with Wohlin (2014) and 
Wnuk and Garrepalli (2018), both backward snowballing (reference list from the start set 
of publications) and forward snowballing (citing publications) were applied. The first au-
thor conducted the review and drew the list of the peculiar economics by reading the full 
articles or book chapters identified as relevant to fulfil the objective. The list was then 
assessed by the two co-authors to agree whether each peculiar economics was distinctive 
enough compared to other sectors to be considered in the next step. 
Pioneering sports economics articles published by Rottenberg (1956), Neale (1964), 
Jones (1969), Sloane (1969, 1971) and El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) represented the initial set 
of publications reviewed. The inclusion/exclusion criteria were based on whether a pub-
lication identified (a) new peculiarity(ies) or strengthened the rationale of (a) peculiar-
ity(ies) compared to previous publications. The articles initially reviewed were comple-
mented with other contributions identified as relevant for the purpose of the review by 
Fort and Quirk (1995), Andreff and Staudohar (2000), Kahn (2000), Noll (2003), Szymanski 
(2003) and Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005). 
The backward snowballing approach proved particularly helpful in uncovering arti-
cles published prior to Rottenberg (1956). For example, the latter quoted a law comment 
by Craig (1953), which led to the identification of further (early) law publications by Stay-
ton (1910), M. L. C. (1946), Topkis (1949), and a work entitled Organized Baseball and the 
Law (1937). Importantly, these publications have in common that they have a strong focus 
on the former reserve rule (or clause) in American baseball. The reserve rule permitted a 
baseball team to renew a player’s contract for the following year at a price it could fix, 
subject to the salary in the following year being not less than 75% of the current salary 
(Rottenberg 1956). Similarly, forward snowballing allowed for the identification of contri-
butions that are more recent. For instance, by looking at the references citing Stayton 
(1910) on Google Scholar, the first author came across DeLand (2015)’s honours thesis in-
vestigating the reserve rule from its establishment in 1879 to 1953. From the reference list 
of DeLand (2015)’s thesis, the first author was able to identify a non-scientific article enti-
tled The business side of baseball (1912) and a book by Evers and Fullerton (1910), also 
relevant to the topic. 
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Through their analysis of the early developments of baseball in the United States and 
football in England during the 19th century, Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005) also contrib-
uted to the identification of some peculiar economics of professional team sports under-
stood by the actors of the time. In particular, Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005) refer to the 
book written by Spalding (1911), involved in drafting the constitution of the National 
League created in 1876 in baseball. 
In addition, any book reflecting on games can provide interesting insights in the at-
tempt to establish an exhaustive list of the economic peculiarities of professional team 
sports. In particular, the book written by Caillois (1961) entitled Man, Play and Games 
enabled one to identify some peculiarities of games relevant to the objective of the current 
study. 
Based on the literature mentioned above, 50 peculiar economics (understood in a 
broad sense, i.e., either intrinsically economic or with economic consequences) of profes-
sional team sports were identified and deemed distinctive enough compared to (at least 
most) other sectors. They are listed and explained in Table 1. It is acknowledged that the 
list is not exhaustive and could have been extended further. However, the authors agreed 
to limit the initial list to no more than 50 peculiar economics of professional team sports, 
before reducing it further. This was to allow authors to investigate their applications to 
esports in sufficient depth. The limitations of this approach are developed further towards 
the end of the manuscript. 
Table 1. 50 peculiar economics of professional team sports. 
Num-
ber 
Peculiar Economics Explanation Source(s) Score
1 
Players performing in 
public as a means of at-
tracting an audience 
Players do not only produce the end product (the 




Audience attracted by the 
players’ level of sporting 
specialisation 










Need for two competitors 
to produce a game (con-
joint product) 
A competitor cannot produce alone, it needs a rival 
to produce the game, as opposed to products tech-
nologically resulting from a single process in other 
sectors 
Neale (1964) 3 
5 
Uncertainty of the prod-
uct 
Games are not alike, and the conditions of the game 
are constantly changing during its progress 
Stayton (1910) 0 
6 
Need to agree on the time 
and venue of the game be-
tween teams 
Two competitors have to agree when and where they 
will produce the game 
Noll (2003) 0 
7 
Need for rules of the 
game 
Two competitors have to agree to follow the same 
rules to produce the game, as opposed to different 
organisations not having to agree to follow the 
same rules to produce the product in other sectors 
Caillois (1961), Spalding 




Need for a common set of 
rules for all games 
All competitors have to agree to follow the same 
rules to produce games for the best development of 
the sport 
Spalding (1911), Szyman-
ski and Zimbalist (2005) 
0 
9 
Need for a national gov-
erning body to establish 
rules 
When a sport is developed enough at the national 
level, there is a need for a national organisation with 
the legitimacy to establish uniform rules 
M. L. C. (1946), Spalding 
(1911), Szymanski and 
Zimbalist (2005) 
0 
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10 
Need for officials to en-
force rules during games 
Increased competitiveness and stakes make neces-
sary the presence of officials enforcing the rules 
and keeping the score, as opposed to organisations 
in other sectors not needing the presence of officials 
when producing 
FIFA (n.d.), Noll (2003) 2 
11 
Need for rules of the 
game equalising chances 
between teams 
The playing field is laid out and players are distrib-
uted so as to give teams equal chances  Caillois (1961), Evers  
and Fullerton (1910) 
0 
12 
Incentive to produce max-
imal effort for players 
Equal chances between teams means that they have 
an incentive to play their best 
0 
13 Uncertainty of outcome 
Equal chances between teams means that the audi-
ence does not know in advance who is going to win 
the game 
Neale (1964), Organized 
Baseball and the Law 
(1937), Rottenberg (1956) 
3 
14 Competitive balance 
Need for sporting equilibrium between teams to 
generate outcome uncertainty attracting fan de-
mand and, as such, revenues 
Neale (1964), Rottenberg 
(1956), Topkis (1949) 
2 
15 
Satisfaction of spectators’ 
emotional and spiritual 
needs 
“Quest for excitement” understood as the need for 
pleasurable excitement and its pleasurable resolution 
Bromberger (2005), Elias 
and Dunning (1986), Szy-






Emotions optimised with partisanship 
Bromberger (1995, 2005), 
Spalding (1911), Szyman-




Possibility to express col-
lective antagonisms due 
to rivalry 
Game as a forum for the expression of collective local 
or regional antagonisms 
Bromberger (1995, 2005), 
Spalding (1911), Szyman-
ski and Zimbalist (2005) 
0 
18 
Presence of crowd vio-
lence 
Antagonisms leading to crowd violence and hooli-
ganism 
Carnibella et al. (1996), 
Spaaij (2014), Szymanski 
and Zimbalist (2005) 
0 
19 
Availability of statistical 
information on workers 
Way to detect talent and information sought by fans 
Kahn (2000), Szymanski 
and Zimbalist (2005), The 
Business Side of Baseball 
(1912) 
0 
20 Possibility of scouting Access to competitors’ employees at work 
Organized Baseball and 
the Law (1937), The Busi-




Possibility to observe rival 
clubs 




Additional fans attracted will have lower quality 
game seats, meaning lower revenue (returns) per seat 
Neale (1964) 
0 
23 Input–enthusiasm effect 
Regionalisation of public attention and private con-
centration increases the quality of inputs (and reve-
nue per seat) in the area 
0 
24 Roger Maris cobweb 
Demand in t+1 responds to supply in t, instead of 
supply in t+1 responding to demand in t 
0 
25 
Bobby Layne rigidity and 
Archie Moore indivisibil-
ity 
One good player cannot be replaced by two weaker 
players on the pitch 
0 
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26 Interest of the media 
TV and radio rights but also interest of the newspa-
pers 
Neale (1964), Rottenberg 




Possibility to sell several 
times the same product 
Game sold to fans attending in the stadium or arena 
but also watching on TV 
Neale (1964) 2 
28 Game enables gambling Possibility to bet on game outcome Szymanski and Zimbalist 
(2005) 
1 




Products using club brand and players 
Andreff and Staudohar 




Interest of the public sec-
tor 
Use of public funding and avoidance of expenditure 
allowed by public organisations (e.g., stadium rent) 
0 
32 Interest of patrons 
Funding to be able then to bet on game outcome, ben-









Way to provide more importance to games 
Spalding (1911), Szyman-
ski and Zimbalist (2005) 
0 
35 
Attractiveness of the quest 
for a championship 
Fans and actors enjoy the contest for a championship 
Noll (2003), Szymanski 
and Zimbalist (2005) 
0 
36 
Organisation of a national 
championship 
Competition at a national level with a series of games 
between teams, although they are free to fix their 




Organisation of a na-
tional league 
Competition at a national level with regular games 




Existence of a regular 
schedule establishing 
when and where games 
will be played over one 
season 
Schedule established by the league and agreed by 
clubs 
Noll (2003), Szymanski 
and Zimbalist (2005) 
1 
39 
Reduction of transaction 
costs 
League enables clubs to coordinate scheduling, rather 
than relying on a series of bilateral agreements 
Noll (2003) 1 
40 
Sporting firms as mul-
tifirm plants 
Plant encompassing playing fields and league, with 
sporting firms selling an indivisible product and con-
tributing exactly the same inputs 
Neale (1964) 0 
41 
Organisation of only one 
major national league 
(monopoly) 
History shows that competitor national leagues do 
not survive or merge/cooperate with the existing 
league 
M. L. C. (1946), Szyman-
ski and Zimbalist (2005) 
2 
42 
A major national league 
as a natural monopoly 
Only one annual national champion can be 
crowned, and the championship must be open to all 
major league teams 
Neale (1964), Noll (2003) 1 
43 League standing effect 
Excitement derived by fans from the changes or 
possibilities of changes in the league table 
Neale (1964) 2 
44 
Existence of a national 
“organised sport” 
Discipline organised at the national level through a 
series of agreements or an all-encompassing govern-
ing body 
M. L. C. (1946), Szyman-
ski (2003), Topkis (1949) 
0 
45 Need for regulation 
Need to prevent corruption, match-fixing, the prac-
tice of clubs “poaching” each other’s players and 
clubs forced out of existence 
M. L. C. (1946), Rotten-
berg (1956), Sloane 
(1969) 
2 
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46 
Restriction on the mobility 
of players (monopoly for 
the club over players) 
Players cannot leave their current club whenever 
they want 




Most players accept re-
striction on their mobility 
Players are well paid compared to what they would 
earn in another sector 
Organized Baseball and 




Payment of transfer fees 
for players 
A club interested in a player under contract in an-
other club has to pay a transfer fee to the latter 
Sloane (1969), The Busi-
ness Side of Baseball 
(1912) 
2 
49 Players as assets 
Players have a value for their club due to their contri-
bution to its revenue through their activity and the 
potential to sell them 




A professional sport club 
is not necessarily profit 
maximiser 
If a company usually looks for profit, a professional 
sport club may be primarily interested in winning 
on the pitch 
Sloane (1969, 1971) 3 
2.2. Assessment Process and 12 Main Peculiar Economics Identified 
Based on the list of 50 peculiar economics initially established, a two-round scoring 
assessment was conducted in triangulation to identify the main ones. Each of the three 
authors individually scored, from low through medium to high, the extent to which these 
peculiar economics (1) differ from other sectors and (2) are core to the way the industry 
operates, before selecting those scoring high for both dimensions. 11 (one author) or 12 
(two authors) peculiarities were eventually selected for the first round. A score was then 
derived for each peculiar economics, based on the number of times they were in the three 
authors’ top 11/12 lists (score from 0 to 3, see Table 1). The peculiar economics chosen by 
at least two authors (score of at least 2) were considered as the main ones, based on further 
discussion and agreement between the three authors. This process led to the identification 
of 12 main peculiar economics of professional team sports derived from the ones in bold 
in Table 1. There are more than 12 peculiar economics in bold in Table 1 (16), but the 
authors finally agreed to group together some closely related based on their further dis-
cussion. Specifically, the peculiarities 26 “interest of the media”, 30 “opportunity for mer-
chandised products” and 33 “opportunity for sponsorship” were grouped together under 
the peculiarity ‘sources of finance’. This explains why the peculiarities 26 and 30 are in 
bold in Table 1, despite their scores being 1. The same applies to peculiarity 42 “a major 
national league as a natural monopoly”, grouped together with peculiarity 41 “organisa-
tion of only one major national league (monopoly)”. The 12 main peculiar economics of 
professional team sports in this article are in Table 2. It is worth noting that some of them 
are similar to the nine unique economic aspects of sports recently highlighted by Rascher 
et al. (2019) and the topics suggested by Mixon (n.d.) for the Special Issue “Advances in 
Sports Economics” published in Economies in 2019 and 2020. 
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Table 2. 12 main peculiar economics of professional team sports and application to esports. 
Num-
ber 
Peculiar Economics Application to Esports? Source(s) Score
1 
Need for two competi-
tors to produce a mul-
tiplayer game (conjoint 
product) 
Yes, esports as a way to attract an audience re-
lies on a “multiplayer game” 




Need for rules of the 
game 
Yes, the video game consists of rules, i.e., the 
code 
Abanazir (2019), Burk (2013), 
Ducheneaut (2009), Lessig (2006) 
1 
3 
Need for officials to en-
force rules during 
games 
The code enforces rules, but officials are still 
needed to ensure players stick to them 





come / competitive bal-
ance 
Yes, in esports in general according to Blizzard 
Entertainment (2002), no in elite esports accord-
ing to Mangeloja (2019) but findings questiona-
ble 
Blizzard Entertainment (2002), 
Mangeloja (2019) 
- 
5 Sources of finance 
Some similarities in the sources but also some 
differences in their weights 
Mangeloja (2019), Newzoo (2020) 0.5 
6 
Possibility to sell sev-
eral times the same 
product 
Yes, but fewer opportunities Scelles et al. (2020), Ströh (2017) 0.5 
7 
Organisation of a na-
tional league 
Organisation of leagues, but international ra-
ther than national 
Jalonen (2019) 0.5 
8 
Organisation of only 
one major national 
league as a natural mo-
nopoly 
No natural monopoly at a (sub)genre level, e.g., 
competition between FIFA and Pro Evolution 
Soccer in football games 
Blum (2016), Noll (2003) 0 
9 League standing effect Not tested yet 
Andreff and Scelles (2015), Hum-
phreys and Zhou (2015), Neale 
(1964) 
- 
10 Need for regulation 
Yes, with similar issues as in sports, e.g., dop-
ing, corruption, match-fixing, “poaching” and 
financial difficulties 
Ashton (2020), ESA (2019), 
Holden et al. (2017), Mitchell 
(2014), Naweed et al. (2020), 
Stronka (2020), Valentine (2019) 
1 
11 
Payment of transfer 
fees for players 
Yes, amounts still very far from what exists in 
men’s football, but the latter is a specific case in 
professional team sports 




A professional sport 
club is not necessarily 
profit maximiser 
Yes, well-known esports organisations only 
consider the resulting revenue of a transfer in 
how they will buy other players, improve per-
formance, etc., i.e., maximise wins 
Ashton (2020), Sloane (1969, 1971), 
Terrien et al. (2017) 
1 
 Overall score in terms of similarities between professional team sports and esports (out of 10) 7 
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3. Results: Do the Main Peculiar Economics of Professional Team Sports Apply to  
Esports? 
Once the identification of 12 main peculiar economics of professional team sports 
was completed, it was possible to reflect on whether they apply to esports. To do so, a 
review of the literature relevant to the economics of esports was conducted following the 
snowballing approach as previously performed. The first author led and wrote the review, 
with the two co-authors reviewing the content and the three authors agreeing on whether 
the main peculiar economics of sports apply to esports. 
The start set of publications was determined by searching key terms “economics” 
and “esports” or “e-sports”. Information channels included Google Scholar, the authors’ 
university online library and their Research Gate feed. In the nascent literature on esports, 
there is not much research focusing specifically on economics. However, contributions by 
Mangeloja (2019), Parshakov (2019), and Ward and Harmon (2019) represent exceptions, 
together with some non-economic publications referring to economic aspects, e.g., Aba-
nazir (2019) and Jalonen (2019). These five recent publications were used as start set. Their 
reference list and their citing publications helped to assess whether the main peculiar eco-
nomics of professional team sports identified above apply to esports. In addition, other 
informal literature such as non-academic articles and reports were utilised to facilitate the 
process. 
The assessment is presented below for each main peculiar economic. Table 2 summa-
rises the findings. A score is allocated to the different peculiar economics in terms of sim-
ilarities between professional team sports and esports, with 1 for a clear similarity, 0.5 for 
some similarities but also differences and 0 for a clear difference. For two of the 12 peculiar 
economics (uncertainty of outcome/competitive balance and league standing effect), no 
score is provided because there is a lack of evidence enabling one to assess whether they 
apply to esports at the elite level. This means that the overall score is out of 10 instead of 
12. Such an overall score is equal to 7, emphasising a degree of similarities between pro-
fessional team sports and esports but also some differences. 
3.1. The Need for Two Competitors to Produce a Multiplayer Game 
The starting point to assess these peculiar economics is to define what is meant by 
“game” in the esports context. Following Schneider (2001) concerning sport, Abanazir 
(2019) asserts that the (video) game has two different meanings: the “instantiation” of the 
(video) game and the (video) game itself. According to the author, “The former depicts par-
ticular ‘instances’ which come into existence by the moves of players, while the latter points to a 
set of rules allowing or prohibiting the moves” (Abanazir 2019, pp. 12021). Abanazir (2019) 
refers to Peeters and Szymanski (2014) and Blair (2012) and, as such, sports economics, 
noting that the latter considers instantiations as “products”. From this perspective, Aba-
nazir (2019) considers that esports is similar to modern sport. Indeed, based on Boyden 
(2011) and Taylor (2012), Abanazir (2019) states that “It is a product, where the presence of 
human opponents is required for the production of a ‘multiplayer game’” (p. 121). Nevertheless, 
Abanazir (2019) stresses a vital difference between esports and modern sport, hence the 
emphasis on the term “multiplayer game”: “Whereas playing without an opponent amounts 
to ‘shadowboxing’ in modern sport, video games provide for the possibility to compete through the 
comparison of single-player scores and speedrun times” (p. 121). It may be argued that such a 
possibility also exists in sports, e.g., hour record in cycling. More importantly, esports as 
a way to attract an audience relies on a “multiplayer game” rather than any esports game. 
As such, the need for two competitors to produce a (multiplayer) game applies to esports. 
3.2. The Need for Rules of the Game 
The rules of the game refer to what Abanazir (2019) identifies above as the second 
meaning of game. Following Burk (2013), Ducheneaut (2010) and Lessig (2006), the author 
underlines that in the case of esports and similar to modern sport, the video game consists 
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of rules, i.e., the code, allowing certain moves but limiting others. Within the context of 
both modern sport and esports, Abanazir (2019) calls the “source” the sets of rules provid-
ing a basis for the instantiation. The author notes that, in modern sport, the source is cre-
ated by the rule-making powers of an organisation to law down the rules of the game, 
usually an international sports federation, i.e., an association of national associations (not-
for-profit organisation). Based on Burk (2013), Abanazir (2019) then specifies what the 
term “source” entails exactly in the esports context, stating that it is the video game, which 
consists of the “code” and the audiovisual representations. The rule-maker is the code-
writer, i.e., the game developer (Juul 2005). According to Abanazir (2019), the developer 
may also be the publisher of the game, which allows it to have direct control over the 
product. Nevertheless, referring to Lunsford (2013), the author stresses that, more often 
than not, the developer is part of an outsourced project where intellectual property rights 
vital for the protection of the source are assigned to the publisher through the use of con-
tracts. In any case, the rules of the game are set by an incorporated body within its juris-
diction, not an association. 
To sum up, similar to modern sport, esports needs rules of the game. However, mod-
ern sport and esports differ in the sense that the rules of the game are usually established 
by an international association in modern sport and an incorporated body in esports. 
3.3. The Need for Officials to Enforce the Rules during Games 
One may think that contrary to sports, officials are not required to enforce the rules 
in esports, since the code itself enforces them. However, in esports, understood as multi-
players games attracting an audience in a physical venue and beyond, there are officials 
making sure that players stick to the rules. The roles of esports officials (referees or ad-
ministrators) can be rather similar to officials in modern sports. For instance, during live 
events, officials are expected to keep an eye on the teams, monitor matches and make sure 
all rules are adhered to. Additionally, in esports, officials ensure that the players are wear-
ing the correct noise-cancelling headsets, and that no foul play is going on (British Esports 
Association 2020a). 
In video games such as FIFA, there are also fictional officials during matches, repro-
ducing those operating during real football matches and enforcing the rules. In line with 
the idea of automatic enforcement of the rules by the code, it may be argued that, with the 
growing use of technological tools such as video assistant referee (VAR) in football or 
television match official (TMO) in rugby, the enforcement of the rules in professional team 
sports have started to become less reliant on physical officials. In a way, this illustrates a 
partial application of a peculiar economic of esports (rules partially enforced by the tech-
nology) to sports. The difference is that, in esports, the technology enforcing the rules is 
part of the video game, while the use of technological tools such as VAR or TMO in sports 
induces a cost that does not only apply to the tools themselves but also to the additional 
officials needed to use them. 
3.4. The Need for Uncertainty of Outcome and Competitive Balance 
The need for uncertainty of outcome and competitive balance has been identified 
from the early 2000s in esports in general rather than elite esports in particular. Indeed, in 
2002, unlike previous Battle.net-enabled games, Warcraft III introduced anonymous 
matchmaking, automatically pairing players for games based on their skill level and game 
type preferences, preventing cheating and inflating their records artificially (Blizzard En-
tertainment 2002). If players want to play with a friend in ranked matches, Warcraft III 
offers “arranged team games”, where a team joins a lobby, and Battle.net will search for 
another team (Blizzard Entertainment 2002). Here, a parallel can be made with the Euro-
pean sport system, with teams belonging to a given level of competition depending on 
their ability. More recently and specifically in elite esports, Mangeloja (2019) finds that 
prize money increases in esports when the best players earn more money. The author 
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interprets this result as an indication of a positive impact of a star effect rather than un-
certainty of outcome and competitive balance on fan demand, proxied by prize money. 
However, it may be argued that the proxy for competitive balance utilised in this study is 
not the most appropriate since it does not rely on sporting performance and may be en-
dogenous with the dependent variable (if there is proportionally more money going to 
the best players when the prize money increases). Parshakov (2019) controls for endoge-
neity by using vector autoregression but does not rely on sport performance either. Fur-
ther research is needed on this topic in elite esports tournaments. 
3.5. The Sources of Finance 
In terms of sources of finance in esports, Mangeloja (2019) notes that many esports 
teams makes a majority of their revenue from sponsorship and advertising (approxi-
mately 60%, but this can go up to 90%), followed by media rights (20%, not including 
digital and streaming, now analysed separately by Newzoo 2020), game publisher fees 
(i.e., the revenues paid by game publishers to independent esports organisers for hosting 
events), and merchandising and ticket sales (10% for each of both). Compared to the main 
leagues in professional team sports, although there are some similarities in the sources, 
there is more revenue coming from sponsorship and advertising, and less from media 
rights, merchandising and ticket sales, while game publisher fees appear as an originality 
in esports. It means that game publishers both provide the video game needed to produce 
events and financial resources to the organisers. 
In its most recent report, Newzoo (2020) has added digital and streaming revenues 
among the sources of finance in esports. Digital revenues refer to revenues generated from 
digital sales of in-game items that utilise team intellectual property (IP) or signed player 
likeness. They represent around 2% of the overall revenue. Streaming revenues refer to 
revenues generated through professional players or signed streamers streaming—either 
on their own channels or on team channels. They also include revenues generated through 
online video platforms from esports teams’ own content broadcast on those platforms. 
Streaming revenues represent less than 2% of the overall revenue. 
3.6. The Possibility to Sell Several Times the Same Product 
The possibility of selling several times the same product applies to esports since 
games can be sold to both media and stadium attendees. Nevertheless, there may be fewer 
opportunities to sell games to different media compared to professional team sports. In-
deed, in esports, there is a preference for online streaming over classic TV broadcasting 
(Ströh 2017). This may reduce the opportunities to sell media rights across countries 
worldwide, as in the example of the English Premier League (EPL) (Scelles et al. 2020). 
However, esports games can still be simulcast (i.e., broadcast across more than one me-
dium, or more than one service on the same medium, at exactly the same time) on televi-
sion networks around the world, as this is the case for Dota 2 (Wikipedia 2021a). Further-
more, it may be argued that the same product is still indirectly sold several times through 
sponsoring and advertising from different countries for the same event. 
To explore further the possibility of selling several times the same product and the 
comparison of its degree of application to sports and esports, it is worth coming back to 
the idea of classic TV broadcasting (the “traditional” way in sports) offering more oppor-
tunities to sell media rights across countries worldwide than online streaming (the pref-
erence in esports). With classic TV broadcasting, TV rights are sold to TV channels in as 
many countries as the number interested in the competition under investigation. One may 
wonder why the same would not apply to online streaming. Indeed, in the example of the 
EPL, the latter is part of its overall TV rights and, as such, subject to the same regulations 
as classic TV broadcasting, in particular the territorial element that applies to where the 
TV rights holders can broadcast games. By contrast, online streaming in esports seems 
largely without constraints in terms of territorial rights, i.e., an esports event is broadcast 
online without territorial restrictions. An explanation is that the main esports events are 
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international and appear in what can be named the global online era. Although some of 
the main sports events are also international (e.g., the Olympic Games and the men’s foot-
ball World Cup), they appeared prior to the global online era and, as such, are regulated 
based on “traditional” deals between the event rights holder and TV channels willing to 
broadcast the event within a given country. Open questions are whether this will continue 
to be the case in sports while we move further in the global online era and, if not, what 
the consequences will be on the possibility to sell several times the same product and rev-
enue. 
3.7. The Organisation of a National League 
If there are some national leagues in esports, most of them involve more than one 
country or are even worldwide, consistent with the idea that esports communities are not 
bound by national borders or time zones (Jalonen 2019). A key difference between sports 
and esports is when they were established. Modern sports appeared in the second half of 
the 19th century, i.e., when communication and transport tools were limited. They started 
with a few teams before growing and being able to organise national leagues. Esports 
appeared much later, in the 1970s (Bountie Gaming 2018; British Esports Association 
2020b), in a globalised world where communication and transport tools were much more 
developed. This means that the nation is not the “natural” territory for an esports league, 
consistent with the elements already developed above about the possibility to sell several 
times the same product. Interestingly, the idea of a European Super League with the best 
continental clubs leaving their domestic leagues to play against each other is a topic that 
has been discussed for more than 20 years now in men’s football (Moatti 1998). The way 
international esports leagues are designed may inform such a reflection to some extent, 
with the limitation that the latter should consider the cultural, historical and traditional 
dimensions related to the organisation of national leagues in European football and sport 
in general. 
3.8. The Organisation of Only One Major National League as a Natural Monopoly 
Based on the elements developed previously, the national level is not the most ap-
propriate for esports. It remains that the idea of the organisation of only one major league 
as a natural monopoly for a specific esports game seems to make sense given that the 
publisher of this specific esports game has control over it (Blum 2016). However, some 
esports games belonging to the same (sub)genre are in competition against each other, 
e.g., FIFA and Pro Evolution Soccer in football games. In other words, competition should 
be considered at a (sub)genre rather than game level in esports, assuming that games 
within this (sub)genre are substitutes (Miroff 2019). Thus, the organisation of only one 
major league as a natural monopoly attracting all major teams (Noll 2003) does not seem 
to hold in esports. 
In the case of the European Super League in men’s football, the organisation of only 
one major national league as a natural monopoly attracting the best domestic clubs would 
be questioned. Indeed, in the countries with the richest leagues, the best domestic clubs 
may leave the major national league to compete in the European Super League. The major 
national league may remain a natural monopoly, but it would not feature the best domes-
tic clubs, contrasting with the idea that the major national league as a natural monopoly 
must be open to all major league teams in the country (Noll 2003). This may jeopardise its 
attractiveness and financial sustainability. 
3.9. The League Standing Effect 
The league standing effect refers to the excitement derived by fans from the changes 
or possibilities of changes in the league table (Neale 1964). Despite Neale (1964) having 
identified it among the peculiar economics of professional sports, it has not been re-
searched until a Special Issue by the Journal of Sports Economics, celebrating the article’s 
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50th anniversary. In this issue, Andreff and Scelles (2015), and Humphreys and Zhou 
(2015) test the impact of the league standing effect on stadium attendance. Although their 
aim is the same, they make different choices by studying two different leagues—French 
football Ligue 1 and Major League Baseball (MLB), respectively—and applying two dif-
ferent methods—in relation to sporting prizes for the home team and any standing for 
any team in the league, respectively. They obtain two different results, with the league 
standing effect being significantly positive in Andreff and Scelles (2015), while it has no 
significant impact in Humphreys and Zhou (2015). The league standing effect remains to 
be tested in esports. 
Although the last three peculiar economics deal with the idea of league, it must be 
noted that esports are also frequently played in tournaments. The latter also exist in pro-
fessional team sports, but the national league remains the level at which teams play most 
games during a season. If the elements around a European Super League developed above 
suggest that the national level as the level at which teams play most games during a season 
might be questioned for some clubs, they do not challenge the idea of league as a core 
feature of professional team sports. 
3.10. The Need for Regulation 
Similar to sports (Stronka 2020), esports encounters doping, corruption and match-
fixing issues (Naweed et al. 2020), with the same type of responses implemented, i.e., play-
ers or teams fined and suspended or banned (Holden et al. 2017). In November 2019, 
games industry international trade bodies united on universal esports principles (Valen-
tine 2019). These bodies are the Entertainment Software Association (ESA) in the United 
States, the Entertainment Software Association of Canada (ESAC), the Association of UK 
Interactive Entertainment (UKIE), the Interactive Software Federation of Europe (ISFE) 
and the Interactive Games and Entertainment Association (IGEA) of Australia and New 
Zealand. They united on four principles: safety and well-being; integrity and fair play; 
respect and diversity; positive and enriching game play. The second principle is directly 
relevant to corruption and match fixing issues. On this principle, the five bodies state that 
“Cheating, hacking, or otherwise engaging in disreputable, deceitful, or dishonest behaviour de-
tracts from the experience of others, unfairly advantages teams and players, and tarnishes the le-
gitimacy of esports” (ESA 2019). 
Esports is also similar to sports in that it can be subject to “poaching” in the absence 
of regulations forbidding such practice. League of Legends (LoL), entirely regulated by 
its publisher Riot Games and touted as a game with one of the most refined player mar-
kets, bars players from persuading others to transfer from one team to another, with the 
existence of clear transfer windows (Ashton 2020). 
Another similarity between sports and esports is around the need to regulate in-
stances in which teams or players encounter financial difficulties. In sports, such financial 
difficulties appeared very early. Indeed, as noted by Rottenberg (1956) based on Celler 
(1952), American baseball clubs were forced out of existence as early as towards the end 
of the 1870s through an Official Release of the National League on September 29, 1879 
(1879), shortly after the adoption of the reserve rule for the first time. In esports, Mitchell 
(2014) provocatively entitled his newspaper article “Dota 2 is the richest of the big esports, 
but its players are the poorest”. The author evidenced that 72% of teams that competed at 
The International (annual esports world championship tournament for Dota 2) in 2013 no 
longer existed in 2014. He added that on the whole, The International had some trends 
that indicate teams build around it, then break apart if they lose. If more teams have had 
access to the prize pool distribution over time (from 14 in 2014 to 18 in 2019; Dota 2 Prize 
Trac n.d.; Liquipedia 2020), their number remains limited to only those making the final 
tournament. Although insolvencies exist in professional team sports, e.g., in men’s foot-
ball (see Scelles et al. 2018; Szymanski 2017; Szymanski and Weimar 2019), clubs usually 
survive. In esports, it remains to be known whether the industry is willing to limit the 
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number of teams disbanding after failure to succeed at a level sufficient to earn enough 
money to sustain their existence and, if so, how to regulate it. 
3.11. The Payment of Transfer Fees for Players 
Ashton (2020) evidences the existence of transfer fees for esports players, while Han-
cock (2018) mentioned transfer fees for top players in China being typically around RMB 
1m–RMB 2m (USD 0.145m–USD 0.29m) towards the end of 2018. These amounts are still 
far from what exists in men’s football, which is, however, a specific case in professional 
team sports (Rockerbie 2020). Interestingly, the German website Transfermarkt estimates 
men’s football players’ value since 2005. As noted by Scelles et al. (2016), “Fans discuss 
player values in the Transfermarkt’s (2012) market value forum with the necessity to justify their 
calculation—these are then taken into consideration by Transfermarkt in addition to its experts’ 
evaluations in its update of player values” (p. 689). There are not such estimates in esports. 
Ashton (2020) investigates what determines an esports player’s market value. He under-
lines that there are standard measures of a player’s value such as current and future sala-
ries (and multiples thereof), how long the contract lasts, and how many similar transac-
tions are across various regions. He also notes that some of the LoL team representatives 
said they know how high other teams’ bids were within their relevant league, as well as 
neighbouring leagues. Ashton (2020) adds that when it comes to games with an open mar-
ket, such as Counter Strike: Global Offensive (CS:GO), there is not a precedent to base a 
player or team’s value on. He highlights that those he spoke to expressed a need for more 
robust data, with some stating that the transfer fees were completely arbitrary. An initia-
tive similar to the Transfermarkt in men’s football may be relevant to esports, especially 
if its revenue continues to grow and the transfer fees for players become higher in the 
future, following the steps of men’s football. 
3.12. A Professional Sport Club Is Not Necessarily Profit Maximiser 
Ashton (2020) informs that, like football and baseball, there are feeder organisations 
in esports, which specifically create academy/developmental players, or even whole 
teams, and generate revenue through their transfers. Those feeder organisations can be 
seen as profit maximisers. However, Ashton (2020) mentions that those teams are unlikely 
to ever compete in a Valve Major (Valve being an American video game developer, pub-
lisher, and digital distribution company, it is the developer of video game series such as 
Counter Strike and Dota; Wikipedia 2021b) or top international competition, but this is 
not their business model. By contrast, the author notes that the well-known esports organ-
isations only consider the resulting revenue of a transfer in how they will buy other play-
ers, improve performance, etc. This suggests that a professional esports club is not neces-
sarily a profit maximiser but looks for wins in the games instead, consistent with Sloane 
(1969 1971) for professional sport clubs. Further research is needed to inform the profit 
versus win maximisation debate in esports, following what has been carried out for pro-
fessional sport clubs (see e.g., Terrien et al. 2017). 
4. Discussion, Implications, Limitations and Conclusions 
This research discusses some economic similarities and differences between profes-
sional team sports and esports, based on the identification of the main peculiar economics 
in the former and their application to the latter. An important finding of the current re-
search relates to the application of the main peculiar economics of professional team 
sports to esports, sometimes providing an equivocal answer about whether such peculiar 
economics hold true for esports. However, this study enables one to better understand the 
economics of esports, which has received scant attention in the literature up to date. This 
in turn opens the door to some implications derived from economics. While some have 
already been introduced previously, e.g., how esports and its international organisation 
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can help inform discussions around the establishment of a European Super League in 
men’s football, at least four other implications merit further discussion. 
The first relates to the need for two competitors to produce a (multiplayer) game as 
a way of attracting an audience (and even more competitors to produce an event consist-
ing of a number of games). This is relevant for esports players, managers and event or-
ganisers as esports reflect the specific nature of the sport industry, whereby competition 
between two teams or players is needed for the game to occur. This suggests the need for 
a minimum level of economic cooperation between competitors, consistent with the idea 
of coopetition also applying to the sport industry (Feuillet et al. 2020; Lorgnier and Su 
2014; Wemmer et al. 2016). 
Second, the sources of finance in esports align with some of the main professional 
team sports but their weights differ, with sponsorship and advertising being far more im-
portant in esports (60% to 90% of the sources) while media rights are far less important 
(around 20%). Consistent with the idea that professional sports clubs should diversify 
their sources of finance to limit their media rights dependency, esports teams should re-
flect on how to diversify their revenues to avoid a too strong a dependency on sponsor-
ship and advertising. Although digital and streaming revenues are still limited, they grow 
quickly, and this should continue to be the case until at least 2023 (Newzoo 2020). This 
may help esports teams reach a better equilibrium across sources of finance and limit their 
financial difficulties in the case of a decrease in sponsorship and advertising revenues. 
Exploring further developments in digital and streaming revenues may also contribute to 
a more balanced model of finance for sports clubs in a context where the Coronavirus 
crisis has shown that unplanned events might question TV rights. This was illustrated by 
the example of the broadcaster Canal + not willing to pay the full amount initially agreed 
for the 2019–2020 French men’s football Ligue 1 and Ligue 2 (Moatti and Hermant 2020a), 
before the situation even worsens with the main broadcaster Mediapro not able to pay the 
amount agreed and eventually exiting the market (Moatti and Hermant 2020b). 
Third, it has been argued that the national level is not the most appropriate for es-
ports leagues, one reason being that they appeared in a globalised world. Another reason 
may be that the initial numbers of elite players and fans were too limited at the country 
level to sustain successful national leagues. However, these numbers have increased over 
time around the world, e.g., League of Legends reached 348.8 million live esports hours 
watched in 2019 (Newzoo 2020). Esports content includes professional gaming matches 
and pre- and post-game analysis, by opposition to non-esports content including stream-
ers, influencers, and talk shows (Newzoo 2020). League of Legends organises national 
leagues in China (League of Legends Pro League) and South Korea (League of Legends 
Champions Korea). Both leagues serve as route to qualification for the annual League of 
Legends World Championship, on the model of non-American national sports leagues 
serving as a route to qualification for continental competitions. It may be the case that a 
growing number of national League of Legends leagues develop around the world, with 
the possibility of generalising the process of national leagues serving as route to qualifi-
cation for the annual League of Legends World Championship. With such an evolution, 
League of Legends may be inspired by the way professional sports leagues operate, alt-
hough national sports leagues provide access to continental rather than world competi-
tions. If esports moves towards a generalisation of national leagues, how fans would re-
spond to such move may inform the reflections about the future of sports and the oppor-
tunity of a European Super League in men’s football (and other sports) discussed previ-
ously. 
Fourth, similar to sports, it has been emphasised that esports need regulation, e.g., to 
prevent financial difficulties. As mentioned previously, Mitchell (2014) evidenced that 
72% of Dota 2 teams that competed at The International in 2013 no longer existed in 2014. 
This was due to the fact that only the teams making the final tournament had access to the 
prize pool distribution, which still holds true. According to the author, the solution is ob-
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vious: to spread the money around rather than only supporting the highest tier of profes-
sionals. It remains to be assessed whether such a solution would be easy to implement 
without resistance from the best teams and players in a game where actors have been used 
to the prize pool distribution described above over time. Theoretical implications can be 
derived from this in relation to the superstars effect (Ward and Harmon 2019), prize struc-
ture and performance, and winner-take-all market. Such situations have also emerged in 
sports, e.g., individual sports such as NASCAR (Humphreys and Frick 2019) and men’s 
tennis and golf (Feuillet et al. 2018). In such individual sports, Feuillet et al. (2018) note 
that many players cannot live from their sporting activity, a situation that echoes the re-
ality in some esports such as Dota 2. A European Super League may have a similar impact 
on many clubs in team sports. 
In esports, a potential way to reduce the financial inequalities between teams and 
players may come from the suggestion formulated above that the growing numbers of 
elite players and fans may lead to a generalisation of national leagues serving as a route 
to qualification for the main competition. Indeed, the existence of national leagues may 
enable the implementation of more egalitarian revenue sharing schemes. However, this 
would depend on how the sources of finance would evolve in the future with such na-
tional leagues. As it stands, sponsoring and advertising to individual teams is the main 
source and is not eligible to revenue sharing given its individual nature. Similar to sports, 
media rights would be key, and their development would be uncertain in an environment 
favouring online streaming. 
It is acknowledged that the present research has some limitations. In particular, the 
choice of limiting the initial list of peculiar economics of professional team sports to 50 
peculiarities means that some additional peculiar economics applicable to esports were 
not developed in the manuscript. Besides, some aspects studied in sports economics and 
applicable to esports were dismissed because they were not considered as “peculiar” eco-
nomics of professional team sports. Aspects not covered in the paper include topics inves-
tigated in both sectors such as team diversity (Parshakov et al. 2018), tournament prize 
structure (Coates and Parshakov 2016) and managerial efficiency (Coates et al. 2020). 
Overall, this study provides an economic contribution to the comparison between 
sports and esports, adding to the ongoing debate about their similarities and differences. 
Although some economic differences are identified between professional team sports and 
esports, it is worth noting that they do not disqualify esports from being considered as a 
sport. Indeed, having an official enforcing the rules, a national league or a monopoly at 
the territorial level are not prerequisites to being a sport. As a whole, the present research 
is even rather supportive of a number of economic similarities between professional team 
sports and esports, as indicated by the similarity score of 7 out of 10. Both professional 
team sports and esports sharing a range of economic similarities may simply translate the 
possibility that esports are a specific form of sports. Arguably, esports that have been es-
tablished much more recently than (other) sports could provide some insights about the 
future development of sport, as suggested in the manuscript. Beyond assessing whether 
the peculiar economics of sports apply to esports, it derives some implications for both. 
Besides, it underlines some directions for future research in esports, e.g., the uncertainty 
of the outcome/competitive balance, league standing effect and profit versus win maximi-
sation debate. It also suggests reconsidering some topics in sports with the lens of esports. 
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, N.S.; methodology, N.S.; validation, N.S., Q.P. and M.V.; 
review, N.S.; formal analysis, N.S., Q.P. and M.V.; writing—original draft preparation, N.S.; writ-
ing—review and editing, N.S., Q.P. and M.V. All authors have read and agreed to the published 
version of the manuscript. 
Funding: This research received no external funding. 
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable. 
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable. 
Economies 2021, 9, 31 16 of 19 
 
Data Availability Statement: The data used in this literature review come from the research re-
viewed, the list can be found in references. 
Acknowledgments: The authors thank their university for having provided them with the oppor-
tunity to conduct this research. All errors are the authors’ own. 
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. 
References 
Abanazir, Cem. 2019. Institutionalisation in e-sports. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 13: 11731. doi:10.1080/17511321.2018.1453538. 
Andreff, Wladimir, and Nicolas Scelles. 2015. Walter C. Neale fifty years after: Beyond competitive balance, the league standing effect 
tested with French football data. Journal of Sports Economics 16: 81934. doi:10.1177/1527002514556621. 
Andreff, Wladimir, and Paul D. Staudohar. 2000. The evolving European model of professional sports finance. Journal of Sports Eco-
nomics 1: 25776. doi:10.1177/152700250000100304. 
Ashton, Graham. 2020. How the Esports Player Transfer Market Differs from Soccer or the NBA. The Esports Observer. Available 
online: https://esportsobserver.com/esports-player-transfers-2020/ (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Bertschy, Marjorie, Hans Mühlbacher, and Michel Desbordes. 2020. Esports extension of a football brand: Stakeholder co-creation in 
action? European Sport Management Quarterly 20: 4768. doi:10.1080/16184742.2019.1689281. 
Blair, Roger D. 2012. Sports Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Blizzard Entertainment. 2002. Warcraft III: Instruction Manual. Irvine: Blizzard Entertainment. 
Blum, Bryce. 2016. Power dynamics in esports: The role of the publisher. ESPN. Available online: https://www.espn.co.uk/es-
ports/story/_/id/15577117/power-dynamics-esports-role-publisher (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Bountie Gaming. 2018. The history and evolution of esports. Medium. Available online: https://medium.com/@BountieGaming/the-
history-and-evolution-of-esports-8ab6c1cf3257 (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Boyden, Bruce E. 2011. Games and other uncopyrightable systems. George Mason Law Review 18: 43979. Available online: 
https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/82/ (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
British Esports Association. 2020a. What Is a Tournament Admin? Available online: https://britishesports.org/careers/admin-referee/ 
(accessed on 19 January 2021). 
British Esports Association. 2020b. A Brief History of Esports and Video Games. Available online: https://britishesports.org/news/a-
brief-history-of-esports-and-video-games/ (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Bromberger, Christian. 1995. Football as world-view and as ritual. French Cultural Studies 6: 293311. doi:10.1177/095715589500601803. 
Bromberger, Christian. 2005. Le football comme drame philosophique [Football as philosophical drama]. Le Nouvel Observateur hors-
Série 60: 2227. 
Burk, Dan L. 2013. Owning e-sports: Proprietary rights in professional computer gaming. Pennsylvania Law Review 161: 153578. 
Available online: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol161/iss6/3/ (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Caillois, Roger. 1961. Man, Play and Games. Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. 
Carnibella, Giovanni, Anne Fox, Kate Fox, Joe McCann, James Marsh, and Peter Marsh. 1996. Football violence in Europe. (Report to 
the Amsterdam Group). Oxford: The Social Issues Research Centre. Available online: http://www.sirc.org/publik/football_vio-
lence.pdf (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Celler, Emanuel. 1952. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives (82d Cong., 1st Sess.), Serial No. 1, Part 6: Organized Baseball. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
Chester, D. Norman, Clifford H. Barclay, Nicholas Davenport, Bernard Donoughue, B. Mervyn Griffiths, Lewis Hawser, A. Davis 
Munrow, W. J. “Bill” Slater, Arthur Tiley, Brian Walden, and Magnus J. Williamson. 1968. Report of the Committee on Football. 
London: Department of Education and Science. Available online: https://archive.org/details/op1269254-1001 (accessed on 19 
January 2021). 
Coates, Dennis, and Petr Parshakov. 2016. Team vs. individual tournaments: Evidence from prize structure in eSports. In Higher 
School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 138/EC/2016. Available online: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2787819 (accessed on 2 February 2021). 
Coates, Dennis, Petr Parshakov, and Sofia Paklina. 2020. Do managers matter: Evidence from e-Sports. Contemporary Economic Policy 
38: 30412. doi:10.1111/coep.12442. 
Craig, Peter S. 1953. Monopsony in manpower: Organized baseball meets the antitrust laws. Yale Law Journal 62: 576–639. Available 
online: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol62/iss4/3 (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Cunningham, George B., Sheranne Fairley, Lesley Ferkins, Shannon Kerwin, Daniel Lock, Sally Shaw, and Pamela Wicker. 2018. 
eSport: Construct specifications and implications for sport management. Sport Management Review 21: 16. 
doi:10.1016/j.smr.2017.11.002. 
DeLand, Kyle. 2015. The Rule of Unreason: The Reserve Clause before the Law, 1879–1953. Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 
Vanderbilt University Institutional Repository. Nashville, TN, USA. Available online: https://ir.vanderbilt.edu/bitstream/han-
dle/1803/7112/HHTDelandKyle2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Dota 2 Prize Trac. n.d. Dota 2 Prize Pool Tracker. Available online: https://dota2.prizetrac.kr/ (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Economies 2021, 9, 31 17 of 19 
 
Ducheneaut, Nicolas. 2009. Massively multiplayer online games as living laboratories: Opportunities and pitfalls. In Online Worlds: 
Convergence of the Real and the Virtual. Edited by Bainbridge William Sims. London, Dordrecht, Heidelberg and New York: 
Springer, pp. 13545. 
El-Hodiri, Mohamed, and James Quirk. 1971. An economic model of professional sports league. Journal of Political Economy 79: 
130219. Available online: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1830103 (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Elias, Norbert, and Eric Dunning. 1986. Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
ESA. 2019. Principles of Esports Engagement. Available online: https://www.theesa.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Principles-of-
Esports-Engagement-Handout-111319-002.pdf (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Evers, John J., and Hugh Stuart Fullerton. 1910. Touching Second: The Science of Baseball. Chicago: The Reilly & Britton Company. 
Feuillet, Antoine. 2019. Fondements et Conséquences de L’action Collective Entre Contributeurs et Bénéficiaires: Modalités de Gé-
nération, de Répartition et D’utilisation des Revenus dans le sport Professionnel [Foundations and Consequences of Collective 
Action between Contributors and Beneficiaries: Modalities of Revenue Generation, Sharing and Use in Professional Sport]. 
Doctoral dissertation, University of Caen Normandie. TEL (theses-EN-ligne) [Doctoral dissertations online]. Available online: 
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-02469038 (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Feuillet, Antoine, Nicolas Scelles, and Christophe Durand. 2018. Revenus et Superstars dans les sports individuels: Le cas du tennis 
et du golf masculins [Revenue and Superstars in individual sports: The case of men’s tennis and golf]. Revue Française de Gestion 
44: 4560. doi:10.3166/rfg.2018.00273. 
Feuillet, Antoine, Mickael Terrien, Nicolas Scelles, and Christophe Durand. 2020. Determinants of coopetition and contingency of 
strategic choices: The case of professional football clubs in France. European Sport Management Quarterly, 
doi:10.1080/16184742.2020.1779776. 
FIFA. n.d. From 1863 to the Present Day. Available online: https://www.fifa.com/news/from-1863-the-present-day-436 (accessed on 
19 January 2021). 
Fort, Rodney, and James Quirk. 1995. Cross-subsidization, incentives, and outcomes in professional team sports leagues. Journal of 
Economic Literature 33: 126599. Available online: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2729122 (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Gough, Christina. 2019. eSports Market Revenue Worldwide from 2012 to 2022 (in Million U.S. Dollars). Statista. Available online: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/490522/global-esports-market-revenue/ (accessed on 12 October 2020). 
Gough, Christina. 2020. eSports Market Revenue Worldwide from 2018 to 2023 (in Million U.S. Dollars). Statista. Available online: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/490522/global-esports-market-revenue/ (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Hancock, Tom. 2018. China Esports Victory Points to Lofty Ambitious in Nascent Sector. Financial Times. Available online: 
https://www.ft.com/content/ba9bf024-dcf0-11e8-9f04-38d397e6661c (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Holden, John T., Ryan M. Rodenberg, and Anastasios Kaburakis. 2017. Esports corruption: Gambling, doping, and global governance. 
Maryland Journal of International Law 32: 23673. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2831718. 
Humphreys, Brad, and Bernd Frick. 2019. Prize structure and performance: Evidence from NASCAR. Economies 7: 102. 
doi:10.3390/economies7040102. 
Humphreys, Brad R., and Li Zhou. 2015. The Louis-Schmelling paradox and the league standing effect reconsidered. Journal of Sports 
Economics 16: 83552. doi:10.1177/1527002515587260. 
Jalonen, Harri. 2019. The value of e-sports is in the eye of the beholder, but can e-sports operators what the spectators see? Advances 
in Applied Sociology 9: 30629. doi:10.4236/aasoci.2019.97023. 
Jones, John C. H. 1969. The economics of the national hockey league. Canadian Journal of Economics 2: 120. doi:10.2307/133568. 
Juul, Jesper. 2005. Half-Real: Video Games between Real Rules and Fictional World. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Kahn, Lawrence M. 2000. The sports business as a labor market laboratory. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 7594. 
doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.75. 
Kim, Young Hoon, John Nauright, and Chokechai Suveatwatanakul. 2020. The rise of e-sports and potential for post-COVID contin-
ued growth. Sport in Society 23: 186171. doi:10.1080/17430437.2020.1819695. 
Lessig, Lawrence. 2006. Code: Version 2.0. New York: Basic Books. 
Liquipedia. 2020. Dota 2: The International 2019. Available online: https://liquipedia.net/dota2/The_International/2019 (accessed on 
19 January 2021). 
Lorgnier, Nicolas, and Che-Jen Su. 2014. Considering coopetition strategies in sport tourism networks: A look at the nonprofit nau-
tical sports clubs on the northern coast of France. European Sport Management Quarterly 14: 87109. 
doi:10.1080/16184742.2013.876436. 
Lunsford, Christopher. 2013. Drawing a line between idea and expression in videogame copyright: The evolution of substantial 
similarity for videogame clones. Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 18: 87118. Available online: https://heinonline-
org.mmu.idm.oclc.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/iprop18&id=93&collection=journals&index=journals/iprop (accessed 
on 4 March 2021). 
M. L. C. 1946. Baseball and the law: Yesterday and today. Virginia Law Review 32: 11641177. doi:10.2307/1068319. 
Mangeloja, Esa. 2019. Economics of esports. Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organizational Studies 24: 3442. Available online: 
http://ejbo.jyu.fi/pdf/ejbo_vol24_no2_pages_34-42.pdf (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Miroff, Max. 2019. Tiebreaker: An antitrust analysis of esports. Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 52: 177224. Available 
online: http://jlsp.law.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/01/Vol52-Miroff.pdf (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Economies 2021, 9, 31 18 of 19 
 
Mitchell, Ferguson. 2014. Dota 2 is the richest of the big esports, but its players are the poorest. The Daily Dot. Available online: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150518071207/http://www.dailydot.com/esports/dota-2-prize-distribution-players/ (accessed 
on 19 January 2021). 
Mixon, Franklin G. n.d. Special Issue “Advances in Sports Economics”. Economies. Available online: https://www.mdpi.com/jour-
nal/economies/special_issues/sports_economics (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Moatti, Etienne. 1998. Superligue ou superfric [Superleague or superdosh]. Stratégies. 
Moatti, Etienne, and Arnaud Hermant.  2020a. Droits TV: Les Millions que Canal + Refuse de Payer [TV Rights: The Millions that 
Canal + Refuses to Pay]. L’Equipe. Available online: https://www.lequipe.fr/Medias/Article/Droits-tv-les-millions-que-pour-
raient-perdre-les-clubs-de-l1/1123091 (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Moatti, Etienne, and Arnaud Hermant. 2020b. Droits TV: L’accord LFP—Mediapro Validé par le Tribunal de Commerce [TV Rights: 
The Agreement LFP—Mediapro Validated by the Commercial Court]. L’Equipe. Available online: https://www.lequipe.fr/Me-
dias/Actualites/Droits-tv-l-accord-lfp-mediapro-valide-par-le-tribunal-de-commerce/1208562 (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Naweed, Anjum, Sidney V. Irwin, and Michele Lastella. 2020. Varieties of (un)sportsmanlike conduct in the FPS esports genre: A 
taxonomic classification of ‘esportsmanship’. Journal of Global Sport Management, doi:10.1080/24704067.2020.1846907. 
Neale, Walter C. 1964. The peculiar economics of professional sports: A contribution to the theory of the firm in sporting competition 
and in market competition. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 78: 114. doi:10.2307/1880543. 
Newzoo. 2020. 2020 Global Esports Market Report. Available online: https://newzoo.com/insights/trend-reports/newzoo-global-es-
ports-market-report-2020-light-version/ (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Noll, Roger G. 2003. The organization of sports leagues. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 19: 53051. Available online: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/23606858 (accessed on 19 January 2021).  
Official release of the National League on September 29, 1879. 1879. New York Clipper, October 11. 
Organized Baseball and the Law. 1937. The Yale Law Journal 46: 1386–90. Available online: https://digitalcom-
mons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol46/iss8/7 (accessed on 19 January 2021).  
Parshakov, Petr. 2019. The Economics of Esports: Elements that Affect Performance. Doctoral dissertation, University of Vigo, Uni-
versity of Vigo Library Investigo. Available online: http://www.investigo.biblioteca.uvigo.es/xmlui/bitstream/han-
dle/11093/1366/Parshakov_Petr_TD_2019_AA.pdf?sequence=4 (accessed on 19 January 2021).  
Parshakov, Petr, Dennis Coates, and Marina Zavertiaeva. 2018. Is diversity good or bad? Evidence from eSports teams analysis. 
Applied Economics 50: 506475. doi:10.1080/00036846.2018.1470315. 
Peeters, Thomas, and Stefan Szymanski. 2014. Financial fair play in European football. Economic Policy 29: 34390. Available online: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24029569 (accessed on 19 January 2021).  
Peng, Qi, Geoff Dickson, Nicolas Scelles, Jonathan Grix, and Paul Michael Brannagan. 2020. Esports governance: Exploring stake-
holder dynamics. Sustainability 12: 8270. doi:10.3390/su12198270. 
Qian, Tyreal Yizhou, Jerred Junqi Wang, James Jianhui Zhang, and Laura Zhenqiu Lu. 2020. It is in the game: Dimensions of esports 
online spectator motivation and development of a scale. European Sport Management Quarterly 20: 45879. 
doi:10.1080/16184742.2019.1630464. 
Rascher, Daniel A., Joel G. Maxcy, and Andy Schwarz. 2019. The unique economic aspects of sports. Journal of Global Sport Management. 
doi:10.1080/24704067.2019.1605302. 
Rockerbie, Duane W. 2020. Revenue sharing and collusive behavior in the Major League Baseball posting system. Economies 8: 71. 
doi:10.3390/economies8030071. 
Rottenberg, Simon. 1956. The baseball players’ labor market. Journal of Political Economy 64: 24258. Available online: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1825886 (accessed on 19 January 2021).  
Scelles, Nicolas, Boris Helleu, Christophe Durand, and Liliane Bonnal. 2016. Professional sports firm values: Bringing new determi-
nants to the foreground? A study of European soccer, 2005–2013. Journal of Sports Economics 17: 688715. 
doi:10.1177/1527002514538976. 
Scelles, Nicolas, Stefan Szymanski, and Nadine Dermit-Richard. 2018. Insolvency in French soccer: The case of payment failure. 
Journal of Sports Economics 19: 60324. doi:10.1177/1527002516674510. 
Scelles, Nicolas, Nadine Dermit-Richard, and Richard Haynes. 2020. What drives sports TV rights? A comparative analysis of their 
evolution in English and French men’s football first divisions, 1980–2020. Soccer & Society 21: 491509. 
doi:10.1080/14660970.2019.1681406. 
Schneider, Angela J. 2001. Fruits, apples and category mistakes: On sport, games, and play. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 28: 15159. 
doi:10.1080/00948705.2001.9714610. 
Scholz, Tobias M. 2019. eSports Is Business: Management in the World of Competitive Gaming. Cham: Palgrave Pivot. 
Sloane, Peter J. 1969. The labour market in professional football. British Journal of Industrial Relations 7: 18199. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8543.1969.tb00560.x. 
Sloane, Peter James. 1971. The economics of professional football: The football club as a utility maximiser. Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy 18: 12146. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9485.1971.tb00979.x. 
Spaaij, Ramón. 2014. Sports crowd violence: An interdisciplinary synthesis. Agression and Violent Behavior 19: 14655. 
doi:10.1016/j.avb.2014.02.002. 
Spalding, Albert G. 1911. America’s National Game. New York: American Sports Publishing Company. 
Economies 2021, 9, 31 19 of 19 
 
Stayton, John W. 1910. Baseball jurisprudence. American Law Review 44: 37493. Available online: https://hei-
nonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/amlr44&collection=journals&id=382&startid=&endid=401 (accessed on 19 Janu-
ary 2021). 
Ströh, Julian Heinz Anton. 2017. The Esports Market and Esports Sponsoring. Marburg: Tectum Verlag. 
Stronka, Waldemar. 2020. Anti-tanking pair matching before an elimination phase of a two-phase tournament. Economies 8: 66. 
doi:10.3390/economies8030066. 
Summerley, Rory. 2020. The development of sports: A comparative analysis of the early institutionalization of traditional sports and 
e-sports. Games and Culture 15: 5172. doi:10.1177/1555412019838094. 
Szymanski, Stefan. 2003. The economic design of sporting contests. Journal of Economic Literature 41: 1137–87. 
doi:10.1257/002205103771800004. 
Szymanski, Stefan. 2017. Entry into exit: Insolvency in English professional football. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 64: 41944. 
doi:10.1111/sjpe.12134. 
Szymanski, Stefan, and Daniel Weimar. 2019. Insolvencies in professional football: A German Sonderweg? International Journal of 
Sport Finance 14: 5468. doi:10.32731/IJSF.141.022019.05. 
Szymanski, Stefan, and Andrew S. Zimbalist. 2005. National Pastime: How Americans Play Baseball and the Rest of the World Plays Soccer. 
Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 
Taylor, Tina Lynn. 2012. Raising the Stakes: E-Sports and the Professionalization of Computer Gaming. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Terrien, Mickael, Nicolas Scelles, Stephen Morrow, Lionel Maltese, and Christophe Durand. 2017. The win/profit maximization de-
bate: Strategic adaptations as the answer? Sport, Business and Management: An International Journal 7: 12140. doi:10.1108/SBM-
10-2016-0064. 
The business side of baseball. 1912. Current Literature 53: 168–72. 
Topkis, Jay H. 1949. Monopoly in professional sports. The Yale Law Journal 58: 691712. doi:10.2307/793297. 
Transfermarkt. 2012. Rules and Advices. Available online: http://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/en/rules-and-advice/topic/an-
sicht_357_551_page1.html (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
University of Melbourne. 2020. Esports and the law (LAWS90157). Available online: https://handbook.unimelb.edu.au/2021/sub-
jects/laws90157 (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Valentine, Rebekah. 2019. Games Industry International Trade Bodies Unite on Universal Esports Principles. Gamesindustry.biz. 
Available online: https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2019-11-05-games-industry-international-trade-bodies-unite-on-uni-
versal-esports-principles (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Ward, Michael R., and Alexander D. Harmon. 2019. Esport superstars. Journal of Sports Economics 20: 9871013. 
doi:10.1177/1527002519859417. 
Wemmer, Felix, Eike Emrich, and Joerg Koenigstorfer. 2016. The impact of coopetition-based open innovation on performance in 
nonprofit sports clubs. European Sport Management Quarterly 16: 34163. doi:10.1080/16184742.2016.1164735. 
Wikipedia. 2021a. Valve Corporation. Available online: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valve_Corporation (accessed on 19 January 
2021). 
Wikipedia. 2021b. Dota 2. Available online: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dota_2 (accessed on 19 January 2021). 
Wnuk, Krzysztof, and Thrinay Garrepalli. 2018. Knowledge management in software testing: A systematic snowball literature review. 
e-Informatica Software Engineering Journal 12: 5178. doi:10.5277/e-Inf180103. 
Wohlin, Claes. 2014. Guidelines for snowballing in systematic literature studies and a replication in software engineering. Paper 
presented at the 18th International Conference on Evaluation and Assessment in Software Engineering, London, UK, May 1314. 
New York: Association for Computing Machinery, vol. 38, pp. 110. 
Yonnet, Paul. 2004. Huit Leçons sur le Sport [Eight Lessons on Sport]. Paris: Gallimard. 
